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ERISA's SILENCE: STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN DEEMED
DENIAL EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA") to protect participants' employee benefits and to estab-
lish uniform requirements for employers who provide these benefits.,
Although Congress intended to provide a framework for the distribution
and enforcement of participants' benefits,2 ERISA does not set the judi-
cial standard of review of an administrator's decision to deny benefits.3
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court held
that the standard of review is de novo unless the plan administrator has
discretion to award benefits, in which case the standard of review is arbi-
trary and capricious. 4 Under the de novo standard, a court does not defer
to the plan administrator's decision. Under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, however, a court does defer to the administrator's decision
unless it is arbitrary and capricious. Circuits are split not only as to when
to apply the de novo standard, but also as to whether a court may con-
sider evidence outside of the administrator's record when applying the
standard of review.5
This paper examines the recent Tenth Circuit's holding in Finley v.
Hewlett-Packard. 6 In Finley, the Tenth Circuit used an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard to review a plan administrator's "deemed denial" of
a participant's benefits. A "deemed denial" occurs when an administra-
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in scattered sections of Titles 5, 18,
26, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
2. Robert Mason Hogg, Note, The Evidentiary Scope of De Novo Review in ERISA Benefits
Litigation After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (1994)
("[E]RISA brought employee benefit plans under federal regulatory authority. ERISA regulates
pension plans and aspects of 'employee welfare benefit plans,' which include health, disability, and
death benefit plans.").
3. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) ("[E]RISA does not
set out the appropriate standard of review for actions.., challenging benefit eligibility determina-
tions.").
4. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
5. Compare, e.g., Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1197, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that evidence outside the administrator's record could not be examined in de novo review);
S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1993) with Quesinberry v. Life
Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 1017, 1026 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that evidence outside the administrator's
record may be examined under de novo review when the court deems it necessary); Moon v. Am.
Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (holding that evidence outside the adminis-
trator's record can always be reviewed under de novo review for ERISA cases).
6. Finley v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 379 F.3d 1168
(10th Cir. 2004).
7. Finley, 379 F.3d at 1174.
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tor fails to notify the participant of its decision to deny benefits within
ERISA' s timeframes.
Part I of this paper examines ERISA's history and the federal
courts' interpretations of ERISA. Part II examines the scope of employee
benefits under ERISA and the provisions providing the framework of an
administrator's internal review and the availability of judicial review.
Part 1I examines judicial standards of review. Part IV examines federal
circuit splits over "deemed denial" cases commencing with the Tenth
Circuit's holding in Finley. Part V analyzes the Tenth Circuit's reasoning
in Finley and recommends a consistent standard in "deemed denial"
cases that reflects other circuits and the legislative intent behind ERISA.
I. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 after escalating concerns of em-
8ployer abuse of workers' benefit plans. Examples of abuse include
breach of fiduciary duty, funding failures, and wrongfully denied bene-
fits. 9 Congress intended to establish a framework that would provide a
comprehensive and consistent set of federal regulations to govern em-
ployment benefit plans.' 0 To provide consistent laws, ERISA pre-empts
all state laws relating to "any employment benefit plan."'"
ERISA states that a plan participant or beneficiary has a right to
federal court review for termination and denial of benefits claims.12 Fur-
ther, Congress intended federal common law to develop under ERISA.
13
ERISA, however, is silent on the appropriate standard of review.
1 4
II. THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS UNDER ERISA
Because ERISA's preemption clause was drafted broadly enough to
exclude most state claims, a claim under the federal statute usually pro-
vides the only relief for a participant or beneficiary. 15 ERISA authorizes
8. Enzio Cassinis, Employment Law: The Tenth Circuit's Stance on the Evidentiary Scope of
a "De Novo" Review in ERISA Benefits Suits, 80 DENV. U. L REV. 529, 532 (2003).
9. Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Con-
forming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
10. Karla S. Bartholomew, Note, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims in Man-
aged Care: Asserting a New Statutory Interpretation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1999).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2004) (stating that ERISA preempts state law); Jayne Elizabeth
Zanglein, Employee Benefits for General Practitioners: Ten Rules That Every Attorney Should Know
About ERISA, 26 TEx. TECH L. REV. 579, 580 (1995); Cassinis, supra note 8, at 532.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2004).
13. Cassinis, supra note 8, at 532 (citing Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th
Cit. 1985)); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
14. Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 824-25 (10th Cir. 1996).
15. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 1083, 1090-91 (2001).
[T]o the extent ERISA's preemption clause is construed broadly to restrict and preempt
other State tort and contractual causes of action, more emphasis is obviously placed on
ERISA's federal causes of action which then may be the sole or predominant cause of ac-
tion and provide the only form of remedy for the participant/beneficiary.
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an individual to bring only certain types of suits in federal court. 16 Schol-
ars have criticized the limitations of ERISA remedies as a "shield for
plan fiduciaries and insurers to limit their liability," which is contrary to
the legislative intent of ERISA to protect employee benefit plan partici-
pants. 17
A. Claims Under § 1132(a)(1)(B)
ERISA authorizes plan participants to sue in federal court for denial
of benefits and breach of fiduciary duty. 18 A participant may sue for de-
nial of employee benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), which provides:
A civil action may be brought-(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to en-
force his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan. 19
ERISA authorizes three different causes of action under § 1132(a).20 The
first claim (relevant to Finley and this paper), under § 1132(a)(1), "af-
fords a cause of action for the participant/beneficiary to request recovery
of plan benefits, enforcement of plan rights or clarification of plan
rights.",21 Section 1132(a)(1) provides for both legal22 (i.e., monetary)
and equitable (i.e., injunctive or declaratory) relief.
23
B. Plan Level Review
Under ERISA, employee benefit plans are subject to an "internal
claim-review procedure." 24 The enforcement rules are codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1133, which provides:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary [of Labor], every
employee benefit plan shall-(1) provide adequate notice 25 in writ-
ing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under
the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such
denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the par-
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
17. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1091.
18. JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., HANDBOOK ON ERISA LITIGATION, § 3.05[A], 3-107 (2d ed.
Supp. 2004) (outlining the statutory relief and right of civil action).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
20. Id.
21. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1092.
22. Id. (citing Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989); Novak v. Andersen
Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1992)).
23. Id. (citing DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES (2d ed. 1993)).
24. Jay Corison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 1, 21 (1992).
25. "Notice" is defined by the regulation as "[t]he delivery or furnishing of information to an
individual in a manner that satisfies the standards of 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-l(b) as appropriate with
respect to material required to be furnished or made available to an individual." 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-1(m)(5) (2004).
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ticipant, and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant
whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by
the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
26
Before a participant or beneficiary can sue, he must exhaust the in-
ternal remedies provided in § 1133.7 All circuits enforce these internal
limitations. 28 The ERISA Handbook on Litigation states that these inter-
nal requirements ensure that a plan participant who appeals an adminis-
trator's denial of benefits decision will "be able to address the determina-
tive issues and have a fair chance to present his case."
29
Ill. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The judicial standard of review under ERISA benefits suits is un-
clear and has caused conflict since the inception of ERISA.30 ERISA
31requires a participant to exhaust all the internal remedies before suing.
The administrator's handling of the patients benefit claims, and all
documents involved in the process, form a detailed administrative re-
cord.32
A. Review of the Plan Administrator's Decision
ERISA gives plan participants an express private right of action to
recover benefits due to them under the terms of their plan regardless of
whether other claims are available.33 However, as mentioned above,
ERISA does not set forth any standard of review in adjudicating denial of
benefit claims.
34
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2004); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1) (requiring written notice to a participant of a denied claim);
JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.03[A], at 4-8; Whitman F. Manley, Litigation Under
ERISA: Civil Actions Under ERISA Section 502(a): When Should Courts Require That Claimants
Exhaust Arbitral or Intrafund Remedies?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 952, 972 (1986) ("[Clourts should
require claimants seeking section 502(a)(1)(B) judicial review of benefit denials to exhaust adminis-
trative procedures before bringing suit, regardless of whether those procedures consist of internal
review by plan administrators or binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.").
28. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1996); Variety Chil-
dren's Hosp., Inc. v. Century Med. Health Plan, 57 F.3d 1040, 1042 (11th Cir. 1995); Hickey v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1995); Communications Workers of Am. v. AT&T,
40 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1994);
Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1990); Curry v. Contract Fabricators, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan, 891 F.2d 842, 846 (11th Cir. 1990); Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1199
(2d Cir. 1989); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (1st Cir. 1988).
29. JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.03[D], at 4-15; see also Ellis v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 236-37 (4th Cir. 1997); Booton v. Lockheed Med. Benefit Plan, 110
F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1997); Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co., 710 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir. 1983).
30. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576.
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133; Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1091-92 (citing Amato v. Bernard, 618
F.2d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 1990)).
32. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1092.
33. JAMEs F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.04[C], at 4-48; see 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B).
34. JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.04[C], at 4-48.
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After ERISA was enacted, the courts "almost uniformly" applied an
arbitrary and capricious standard to review an administrator or fiduci-
ary's benefit decision, giving great deference to the plan decision-
makers.35 This highly deferential standard drew criticism, especially in
cases where the administrator was "not necessarily impartial in the de-
termination of benefit eligibility or construction of plan terms. 37 Further,
some scholars have stated that the adoption of the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review indicated "little regard for the language of
ERISA."
38
B. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch
The United States Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of review in denial
of benefit cases under § 1132(a)(1)(B). 39 The Court held that "a denial of
benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de
novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan. ' 4° The Court set forth the following principles:
* Unless the language of a plan gives a fiduciary discretion to de-
termine eligibility or construe the terms of a plan, a claims decision
by a fiduciary should be reviewed under a de novo standard;
o If the plan language gives the fiduciary discretion to determine eli-
gibility or construe the terms of a plan, a court should not disturb the
decision unless it constituted an abuse of discretion; and
* If a plan fiduciary could gain from denying a claim, the potential
conflict of interest should be taken into account in determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion.
4'
Post Firestone, most circuits use one of two standards to review
employee benefit claims: de novo or the more deferential abuse of discre-
tion standard.42 A plan administrator's decision to deny benefits is gener-
35. Id.; see George L. Flint, ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule, 39 CATH. U. L. REv.
133, 139 (1989); Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1108-09.
36. See Struble v. N.J. Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333-34 (3d
Cir. 1984); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.
1983); Dennard v. Richards Group Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1982).
37. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1109.
38. Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants; Practical Assessment of a Ne-
glected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 746 (1994) ("[C]onflict of interest al-
most always exists between ERISA benefits plans and benefits claimants. Incongruously, and with
little regard for the language of ERISA, the courts initially adopted the arbitrary-and-capricious rule
as the appropriate standard for review .... ").
39. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
40. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
41. JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.04[C], at 4-50.
42. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1130.
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ally reviewed under the de novo standard.43 The de novo standard of re-
view affords less deference to the administrator's decision because it
allows the courts to "second guess" the decision.44 But if the plan gives
the administrator or fiduciary discretion to determine eligibility for bene-
fits or to construe the terms of the plan, then an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review is applied.45 Arbitrary and capricious is synonymous
with abuse of discretion.46 In the Tenth Circuit, the abuse of discretion
standard is generally known as the arbitrary and capricious standard.
47
IV. DEEMED DENIALS
This paper examines the Tenth Circuit's decision in Finley v. Hew-
lett-Packard, which applied a more deferential standard of review-
arbitrary and capricious-to an administrator's "deemed denial" of bene-
fits. As the court noted in Finley, the circuits are split on this issue.48
A. Tenth Circuit: Finley v. Hewlett-Packard
49
1. Background
Ms. Finley was an employee of Hewlett-Packard Corporation from
1969 to 1996.50 In 1996, she suffered from right thoracolumbar scolio-
sis. 51 Ms. Finley's employee benefit plan (the "Plan") was sponsored by
Hewlett-Packard and administered by Voluntary Plan Administrators,
43. See Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2002).
44. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1094.
45. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
46. "All the circuits affirm that there are two applicable judicial standards of review in ERISA
benefit denial claims-the de novo standard and the more deferential standard-abuse of discretion."
Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1130. "The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits prefer the
abuse of discretion standard over the de novo standard." Id. at n.249.
47. Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 (10th Cir. 1996).
48. The Finley court noted the following circuit splits on this issue in footnote five of the
opinion:
Compare Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Emp. Ben. Org. Income Protection Plan, 349 F.3d
1098, 1107- 08 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that the administrator's failure to communicate
with plaintiff until 119 days into the 120-day review period triggers de novo review);
Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., 275 F.3d 291, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2002) (extending no deference to a
plan administrator's post hoc justification, issued only after commencement of litigation,
for a deemed denial of benefits); with McGarrah, 234 F.3d at 1030-31 (holding that an
ERISA plan fiduciary's failure to respond to beneficiary's request for administrative re-
view does not trigger heightened scrutiny absent showing of extreme procedural irregu-
larities); Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir.1993)
("In our view, the standard of review is no different whether the claim is actually denied
or is deemed denied."); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1988) (same).
Finley v. Hewlett-Packard Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 379 F.3d 1168, 1173 n.5
(10th Cir. 2004).
49. Finley, 379 F.3d at 1168.
50. Id. at 1170.
51. Id.
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Inc. ("VPA").52 VPA operates as an independent third-party administra-
tor and is compensated solely by a flat fee.53
On November 29, 1996, Ms. Finley left her job and shortly thereaf-
ter applied to VPA for short-term disability benefits.54 VPA denied these
benefits and paid only after Ms. Finley "administratively appealed with
the help of an attorney. 5 5
Later in July of 1997, Ms. Finley applied for long-term benefits un-
der the Plan.56 According to the Plan, a member is only eligible for long-
term benefits after their short-term benefits have expired if the member is
permanently "unable to perform any occupation for which he or she is or
may become qualified." 7 Thus, Ms. Finley was required to show by "ob-
jective medical evidence" that she was unable to perform any job for
which she was or could become qualified.58
After Ms. Finley was examined by her doctors, as well as those of
VPA, she sent the required reports to VPA in September 1997. 9 VPA
denied long-term benefits on March 11, 1998.60 VPA stated that Ms.
Finley was "capable of performing sedentary work for which she may
become qualified.",6 1 Ms. Finley appealed VPA's denial of long-term
benefits on May 12, 1998.62 Under ERISA's provisions in 1998, an ap-
peal from a denial of benefits must be resolved within sixty days. 63 Simi-
larly, the Plan provided that an appeal must be resolved within sixty days
unless an extension has been granted.64
On July 14, 1988, after a series of exchanges, VPA agreed to make
a decision within sixty days.65 On October 9, 1998, VPA denied the ap-
peal.66
2. Procedural Facts
Ms. Finley sued "under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking recov-
ery of her long-term benefits, and under 29 U.S.C. § 1133, seeking dam-
52. ld. at 1170-71.










63. Id. at 1171-72 (citing that later amendments to this provision did not take effect until
January 1, 2002 so the court applied the older regulation).
64. Id. ("Section 8(c) of the benefits document mimics this regulation, stating: 'In no event
shall the decision of the Claims Administrator be rendered more than one hundred twenty (120) days
after it receives the request for review."').
65. Id. at 1171.
66. Id.
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ages for VPA's alleged failure to provide full and fair review of her
claims. 67 The district court held that VPA's response to Ms. Finley's
administrative appeal was due on September 12, 1998-sixty days after
VPA's July 14 letter.68 VPA, however, denied the appeal on October 9-
twenty-seven days late.69 Thus, Ms. Finley's administrative appeal was
"deemed denied" under ERISA. The district court granted summary
judgment for the VPA using an arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view. 70 Both parties appealed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment.71
3. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the plan using
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to examine the Plan ad-
ministrator's "deemed denied" decision.72 In Finley, the Tenth Circuit
applied the Firestone holding that a denial-of-benefits claim under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) requires a de novo standard unless the administrator of
the plan has discretionary authority to determine eligibility of benefits.
73
In this case, the court held that the Plan administrator had full discretion
to determine eligibility of benefits and granted more deference to the
administrator's decision.74 Further, the court stated that because the Plan
administrator had no financial or other incentive to deny claims and that
the benefits were paid out of the Plan's trust funds, there was no conflict
of interest triggering a less deferential de novo standard of review.75
The Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs contention that the court
owes no deference to the administrator's decision because it was
"deemed denied., 76 The court held that Ms. Finley's administrative ap-
peal falls into an exception to the general use of de novo review for
"deemed denials" because she failed to "provide meaningful new evi-
dence or raise significant new issues . and the delay does not under-
mine confidence in the integrity" of the decision making process.77 The
court held that the plan administrator had "substantially complied" with
the deadline and the delay was "inconsequential" and "in the context of





72. Id. at 1170.
73. Id. at 1172 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989));
Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999).
74. Id. at 1173.
75. Id. at 1175.
76. Id. at 1173.
77. ld. at 1174.
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an on-going, good-faith exchange. 78 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's granting of summary judgment for the defendant.
79
B. Ninth Circuit: Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard 8°
1. Background
In Jebian, the plaintiff was a Hewlett-Packard engineer who suf-
fered from a multitude of orthopedic impairments and was given short-
term disability benefits by the plan administrator-VPA. 8' After the
plaintiff had exhausted his short-term disability benefits, he applied and
was denied long-term benefits by VPA.82 He appealed the denial of
benefits, and sued the plan administrator after it failed to reply within
ERISA's timeframe. 83 The district court reviewed VPA's denial of long-
term benefits under the abuse-of-discretion (arbitrary and capricious)
standard, and granted summary judgment for the plan administrator.
84
2. Decision
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the appropriate standard of
review was de novo.85 The Ninth Circuit held as a matter of first impres-
sion that the "[d]eemed denials are not exercises of discretion." 86 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit held that "deemed denials" are "undeserving of defer-
ence under Firestone, and a de novo standard of review applies. 87 Fur-
ther, the court held that the plan administrator's 119 days of "radio si-
lence" to the claimant's appeal triggered de novo review.18 The Ninth
Circuit did note, however, that using de novo review in certain "deemed
denial" claims may be "tempered" where there is "substantial compli-
ance."
89
78. Id. at 1173-74.
79. Id. at 1173.
80. Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098 (9th
Cir. 2003).
81. Jebian, 349 F.3d at 1101.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1102.
84. Id. ("We conclude that the proper standard of review of VPA's decision in this case is de
novo, and remand for reconsideration of Jebian's claim accordingly.").
85. Id. at 1103 ("The primary question before us, of first impression in this circuit, is whether
a plan administrator's discretion, otherwise within the administrator's discretion, can be accorded
judicial deference when the purported final, discretionary decision is not made until after the claim is
... already automatically deemed denied on review. We conclude that where, according to plan and
regulatory language, a claim is 'deemed . . .denied' on review ... there is no opportunity for the
exercise of discretion and the denial is usually to be reviewed de novo.").
86. Id. at 1106; see also Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., 275 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that
the administrator's failure to exercise discretion and communicate with the plaintiffs prior to litiga-
tion subjected them to de novo review).
87. Jebian, 349 F.3d at 1106.
88. Id. at 1107.
89. Id.
2005]
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C. Fifth Circuit: Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore90
1. Background
In Moore, the plaintiff sought to recover accidental death benefits
under ERISA.9' The plaintiff was employed by Southern Farm Bureau
Life Insurance Company and had coverage for herself and her husband.92
Plaintiffs husband suffered a brain tumor and fatally crashed his vehi-
cle.93 The plaintiff attempted to recover benefits from Southern Farm
Life, the plan administrator.94 Southern Farm Life filed for a declaratory
judgment, asking the court to hold that the plaintiffs policy did not re-
quire it to pay under a policy exception.95 Southern Farm Life did not
communicate the denial of the plaintiffs claim to her before asking for
the declaratory judgment.96 The plaintiff counterclaimed for alleged
deemed denial of benefits.97 The district court applied de novo review
and found for the plaintiff.98 The administrator of the plan appealed.99
2. Decision
The Fifth Circuit held that "[i]n our view, the standard of review is
no different whether the claim is actually denied or is deemed denied."''1°
The court held that the district court erred in using the de novo standard
of review for factual determinations under ERISA and instead applied
the abuse of discretion standard.10 Thus, the court rejected plaintiffs
contention that the failure to provide a written denial within the time-
frames required under ERISA elevates the standard of review from abuse
of discretion to de novo. 10 2 However, the Fifth Circuit held that "under
Firestone, we review the plan administrator's interpretation of the policy
de novo.
' 03
90. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1993).









100. Id. at 101.
101. Id. ("For factual determinations under ERISA plans, the abuse of discretion standard of
review is the appropriate standard; that is, federal courts owe due deference to an administrator's
factual conclusions that reflect a reasonable and impartial judgment.").
102. Id. ("Failure to provide a written denial does not mean that the abuse of discretion stan-
dard announced in Pierre is not applicable.").
103. Id. (emphasis added).
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D. Eighth Circuit: McGarrah v. Hartford Life Insurance Company' °4
1. Background
In McGarrah, the plaintiff sued the plan administrator under ERISA
for terminating his benefits.'05 The plaintiff was a truck driver for Wal-
mart. 1°' After slipping on ice and suffering a herniated cervical disk, he
applied for and received long-term disability benefits. 0 7 Two years later,
Hartford (the employee benefit plan administrator) discontinued benefits
after learning that the plaintiffs physical condition had significantly im-
proved. 0 8 The plaintiff appealed the denial but did not receive a response
from Hartford. 1°9 The plaintiff sued for the denied benefits under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B)." 0 The district court-using the arbitrary and capricious
standard-granted summary judgment for Hartford.1 1'
2. Decision
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's use of the arbitrary
standard and the judgment for the defendant.' 12 The court held that "[i]n
general, the abuse-of-discretion standard applies, if, as in this case, the
plan expressly gives the administrator discretion to determine eligibility
for benefits and to construe the terms of the plan."'" 3 The court re-
sponded to the plaintiffs claim that "procedural irregularities" should
entitle him to a less deferential review of the administrator's decision by
conceding that Hartford's failure to respond is "troubling" and a "serious
procedural irregularity." 114 The Eighth Circuit, however, set forth a "rig-
orous standard" that a participant must meet to get de novo review: the
irregularity must "raise[s] serious doubts as to whether the result reached
was the product of an arbitrary decision or the plan administrator's whim
.. or where procedural irregularities are so egregious that the court has
a total lack of faith in the integrity of the decision making process
The Eighth Circuit held that the "mere presence of a procedural ir-
regularity is not enough to strip a plan administrator of the deferential
104. McGarrah v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2000).




109. Id. at 1029.
110. Id. at 1027.
111. Id. at 1027-28.
112. Id. at 1028.
113. Id. at 1030 (citing Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115).
114. Id. at 1031.
115. Id.
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standard of review."'"16 The court affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant." 
7
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
In Gilbertson v. Allied Signal Inc., decided before Finley, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court's use of arbitrary and capricious in a
"deemed denied" case! 18 In Gilbertson, the plaintiff appealed the admin-
istrator's denial of long-term benefits.' 9 Later, the administrator ex-
tended the time for providing additional medical information in consider-
ing the plaintiffs appeal. 120 But the administrator neither replied to the
appeal within ERISA's required timeframe nor contacted the plaintiff
again. 12 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff's appeal was "deemed
denied.' ' 122 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's use of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard in granting summary judgment for the de-
fendant and remanded for a de novo review.
23
The Tenth Circuit noted in Finley that a court should use de novo
review in a "deemed denied" case: "[w]hen the administrator fails to
exercise his discretion within the required timeframe, the reviewing court
must apply Firestone's default de novo standard.' '124 However, the Tenth
Circuit distinguished Gilbertson, stating that the administrator "made no
decision to which a court may defer" requiring a de novo review.
125
The Tenth Circuit further attempted to qualify Gilbertson by stating
that its decision to apply de novo, instead of the arbitrary and capricious
standard, is not "a hair-trigger rule" resulting in less deference if the ad-
ministrator's decision is "rendered the day after the deadline." 126
In Finley, the Tenth Circuit held that there was a limited exception
(McGarrah exception) to the de novo standard if the "delay was a mere
procedural irregularity that did not undermine its confidence in the integ-
rity of the administrator's decision making process."' 127 The Tenth Circuit
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1030-31 ("In these circumstances, Hartford's failure to respond to McGarrah's
appeal, while wrong, does not undermine our confidence in the integrity of its decision-making
process.").
118. Gilbertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 328 F.3d 625, 631-32 (10th Cir. 2003).
119. Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 629.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 636.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 636-37.
124. Finley v. Hewlett-Packard Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 379 F.3d 1168,
1173 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 631-32).
125. Id. (quoting Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 631-32).
126. Id. at 1173 (quoting McGarrah v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1026, 1031 (8th Cir.
2000)).
127. Id. at 1174 (citing the district court's reliance on the Eight Circuit's decision in McGar-
rah, 234 F.3d at 1026, forwarding this exception to using de novo review in "deemed denial" cases).
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applied the arbitrary and capricious standard because the plaintiff failed
to "provide meaningful new evidence or raise significant new issues [on
administrative appeal]." 128 Also, the Tenth Circuit held that the delay did
"not undermine [the court's] confidence in the integrity of [the adminis-
trator's] decision-making process." 19
The Tenth Circuit reiterated in Finley that the goal of ERISA is to
"promote accurate, cooperative, and reasonably speedy decision-making
based upon a good faith exchange of information between the
administrator and the claimant."'130 Further, the court said that failure by
the plan administrator to respond under the required timeframes can still
be deemed "substantial compliance" if the delay is: "(1) inconsequential;
and (2) in the context of an on-going, good-faith exchange of information
between the administrator and the claimant."'
' 3 1
In Finley, the Tenth Circuit adopted the "substantial compliance
rule" of Gilbertson and held that VPA had substantially complied with
the deadline, albeit late. 32 However, the substantial compliance rule in
"deemed denial" cases fails to "protect the reasonable expectations of the
participants."'133 Thus, when an administrator fails to comply with
ERISA's deadlines and a claim is deemed denied, no deference should be
granted.
The Tenth Circuit in Finley appears determined to grant deference
to a plan administrator's decision to deny benefits. If we re-examine the
purpose and spirit of ERISA-to provide a constructive framework in
order to prevent employer abuses of participants' benefit plans-an ad-
ministrator's failure to respond to a participant or beneficiary's appeal
for denial of benefits is not an acceptable exercise of discretion. Accord-
ingly, the Ninth Circuit held in Jebian that "[d]eemed denials are not
exercises of discretion."'' 34 Congress's intent to "protect employees' 135
should not be construed in "deemed denial" cases to allow administrators
of an employee benefit plan yet another tactic to stall decisions or frus-
trate the process. 136 A plan administrator's failure to respond to an appeal
within the prescribed ERISA timeframes indicates a lack of acting pru-
128. Id. (quoting Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 633).
129. Id. (quoting McGarrah, 234 F.3d at 1031).
130. Id. at 1173 (quoting Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 635).
131. Id. at 1174 (citing Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 635).
132. Id. at 1173-75.
133. George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpre-
tation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 995, 1050 (1995).
134. Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098,
1106 (9th Cir. 2003).
135. See 29 U.S.C § 1001(a) (2004).
136. Flint, supra note 133, at 1048 ("The policy that ERISA seeks to further is to protect the
reasonable expectations of the participants.").
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dently or in "good faith" and courts should not accord deference to the
administrator's decision.' 37
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit treats all denials the same: "[iln our
view, the standard of review is no different whether the claim is actually
denied or is deemed denied."'138 Although the Fifth Circuit prefers the
abuse of discretion for all factual determination reviews, a blanket appli-
cation affords the same deference to an administrator's decision whether
or not it complied with the timeframes provided for under ERISA.
Although the silence of ERISA on an appropriate standard of re-
view was intentional in order to develop federal common law, a standard
of review for "deemed denials" is necessary to provide participants,
beneficiaries, and employers consistent guidelines for compliance. 139
Further, a consistent approach will promote ERISA's goals of "fairness,
disclosure, and due process to participants" with similar claims.'
4° Oth-
erwise, as a scholar has noted, "the method of review chosen by the
courts will determine the fairness by which a plan administrator adminis-
ters an employee benefit plan.
141
Applying de novo review in "deemed denial" cases encourages ad-
ministrators to "protect the reasonable expectations of the partici-
pants.' 42 Plan administrators will follow ERISA's provisions more
closely and act more prudently if they lose the "defendant's shield"
14 of
arbitrary and capricious review in "deemed denial" cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
ERISA's silence has resulted in the current circuit split regarding
the appropriate standard of review of an administrator's "deemed de-
nied" decision. The Tenth Circuit grants more deference than other cir-
cuits to an administrator's decision by using an arbitrary and capricious
standard in "deemed denial" cases when the administrator has substan-
tially complied with ERISA's timeframes. But to comply with ERISA's
purpose and spirit to protect employees, however, courts should apply the
less deferential standard of de novo in "deemed denial" cases. Applying
137. Jebian, 349 F.3d at 1103.
138. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1993).
139. See 120 CONG. REC. 29933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("It is also intended that a
body of federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights
and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 56 (1987) (stating that a federal common law is sought for ERISA provision interpretation).
140. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1175.
141. George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Seige, 39 CATH.
U. L. REV. 133, 133 (1989) (emphasis added).
142. Flint, supra note 133, at 1048.
143. Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants; Practical Assessment of a Ne-
glected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 724 (1994).
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the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard in "deemed denial"
cases provides plan administrators no incentives to comply with ERISA.
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